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Panel II: Cable Versus Broadcast TV:
The "Must Carry" Provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer and Com-
petition Act of 1992
Moderator: John R. Tyler, Esq.a
Panelists: Marc Apfelbaum, Esq.b
Gregory Buscarino, Esq.c
Steven J. Hyman, Esq.d
Robert D. Joffe, Esq.e
MR. TYLER: Good morning. This is the second panel.
We're discussing what are known as the "must carry" provisions
that were passed by Congress in 1992, pursuant to the Cable Act
of that year.' I'm the moderator of this panel. My name is John
Tyler, and I'm the senior trial counsel at the United States Depart-
ment of Justice in Washington, D.C. I acted as the attorney on
behalf of the government before the three-judge district court that
heard this case, Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,2 in
Washington, D.C., last spring. I also assisted in the preparation of
a. Senior Trial Counsel, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; Princeton University, B.A. 1974; Vermont Law School, J.D. 1979.
b. Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary, Time Warner
Cable, Stamford, CT; University of Pennsylvania, B.A. 1978; Georgetown University, J.D.
1983.
c. Sales Administrator and Financial Analyst, National Broadcasting Company, Inc.,
New York, NY; Syracuse University, B.A. 1987; Fordham University, J.D. 1992.
d. Partner, Leavy, Rosensweig & Hyman, New York, NY; Lafayette College, B.A.
1962; Columbia University, J.D. 1965.
e. Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, NY; Harvard University, B.A.
1964, J.D. 1967.
1. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (1992) (codified at47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp.
IV 1992)).
2. 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
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the briefs before the Supreme Court, which was orally argued by
our Solicitor General, Drew S. Days, III, I think it was the second
week of January of this year.
We will be hearing from panelists on both sides of this issue,
including Mr. Gregory Buscarino, who is with the National Broad-
casting Company here in New York. I assume he will be making
remarks in support of the "must carry" provisions. We will also
hear from Mr. Steven Hyman, who is a private counsel. He repre-
sented the National Interfaith Cable Coalition in the Turner litiga-
tion. As opposed to speech issues, he brought claims pursuant to
the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and I think he, better
than I, will be able to articulate specifically what those issues are,
and what his concerns were as an intervening plaintiff in the Turn-
er litigation.
We'll hear also from Mr. Robert Joffe, who is with Cravath,
Swaine and Moore here in New York, who brought a complaint on
behalf of Time Warner. I most especially remember Mr. Joffe's
complaint, because it was over one hundred pages in length and it
argued case law. That's the first time I had ever seen that; I guess
because Time Warner is a multimedia concern, Mr. Joffe would
bring those interests to the pleadings as well.
Lastly we'll hear from Mr. Marc Apfelbaum. He is also with
Time Warner, in-house counsel, and I believe he deals with litiga-
tion matters on behalf of that corporation.
Now, Ted Hirt said earlier today that we at the Justice Depart-
ment do not speak on behalf of the administration, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), or the United States. The
views I will express this morning are mine, although I will be
biased certainly on behalf of the government's position in this
litigation.
For purposes of introduction, I'll just give a broad-view back-
ground as to the interests involved and the players involved, and
possibly also speak to the growth of the cable industry which is
certainly what Congress is concerned about. Cable operators have
come a long way, or the cable industry certainly has come a long
way since it's beginning when it acted solely as a conduit for
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broadcast television. Beginning in the early 1960s, the FCC took
note of the growth of the cable industry and started to assert its
regulatory authority in this area under the 1934 Communications
Act.3 For example, the FCC promulgated a rule which prohibited
cable operators from importing distant broadcasting signals into
local markets.4 I, for a time, lived up in Vermont and the cable
operators up there would bring into the local broadcast area of
Vermont, Channel 9 and Channel 11 of New York City. But, at
least in certain markets, the FCC prohibited this upon the principle
that if cable operators were to import broadcast signals from afar,
that would create a market imbalance or that would be prejudicial
to the interests of the local broadcasters. Whether or not the FCC
had this statutory authority to promulgate these rules went before
the Supreme Court in the United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,5
and the Court found that the FCC did have this authority and is-
sued the decision so stating in 1968.6
Thereafter, the FCC became a little more aggressive and pro-
mulgated other rules.7  For example, one rule required that if you
the cable operator are to be permitted to carry broadcast signals, so
too must you create your own programming. Now, in First
Amendment parlance this would be known as compelled speech,
3. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current
version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The Communications Act of
1934 established the FCC as the primary federal regulatory mechanism for the telecom-
munications industry.
4. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1967); see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157, 166-67 (1968) (citing Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 781-85
(1966)).
5. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
6. Id. at 178 (holding that the FCC has regulatory authority "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting").
7. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417
(1968).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970) (repealed 1974) (providing that "no CATV system
having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast station
unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and
has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other than
automated services"); see United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54
(1972).
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yet the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's authority to promulgate
such a rule in 1972 in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,9 with-
out even touching upon the First Amendment.
In 1984, Congress passed a Cable Act'0 which in essence dereg-
ulated the cable industry and let free market forces determine the
winners and losers, if you will. However, at the same time, while
the cable industry was generally deregulated, the FCC continued to
have concerns about the competitive or anticompetitive impact of
cable operators on broadcasting concerns and promulgated varia-
tions of these "must carry" rules," which were each struck down
by unanimous panels of the D.C. Circuit. First in the Quincy12
decision, which was issued in 1985, and subsequently in the
Century3 decision, which was issued by a second panel of the D.C.
Circuit in 1988.
Interestingly, the judges on these panels represented both spec-
trums of the, or all aspects of the political spectrum, if you will,
and possibly most interesting, included, I forget on which panel,
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg, who of course now sits on the Su-
preme Court.
After the D.C. Circuit had struck down the FCC's "must carry"
rules, in 1992 Congress picked up this baton and promulgated or
enacted its own "must carry" provisions, citing the fact that now
the cable industry has grown into a titan-it's vertically and hori-
zontally concentrated. 14 In the vast majority of local markets, there
exists only one cable operator. 5 We, the viewers, have no choice
as to who our cable company is. Also, Congress found that cable
9. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality opinion).
10. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
11. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.61 (1984); Report and Order, I F.C.C.R. 864 (1986).
12. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
13. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
14. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(4)-(5), 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 521 (Supp. IV 1992)); see generally H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992);
S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133.
15. H.R. REP. NO. 628, supra note 14, at 45.
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now "passes"-that's a term of art-I think somewhere towards 95
percent of the television households.1 6 That is, cable is now avail-
able to 90 percent of us. 7 Fifty-six million of us, over 60 percent
of the households with televisions, are hooked up to cable.18 Con-
gress further found that once we subscribe to cable, it becomes our
only means of receiving video programming. 9 In other words,
your cable company in 60 percent of the market now determines
what we will and will not watch.
More frighteningly, at least as found by Congress, cable compa-
nies are engaging in anticompetitive practices. 20 What they are
able to do, in effect, is have their cake and eat it too. Basically
cable companies receive their revenues from subscriber fees. But
Congress found disturbing incidences of cable companies dropping
broadcast television signals, because by doing so, they could pick
up the advertising revenues of the broadcasting competitors.21
Congress referred most principally to a 1988 FCC study to that
effect, and I think-if my memory serves me correctly-Congress
or that FCC study found that upwards towards 20 percent of cable
companies had engaged in this practice of dropping broadcast sig-
nals.22
On the basis of these findings, Congress enacted what we refer
to in shorthand as sections 4 and 5 of the 1992 Cable Act. 23 Sec-
tion 4 goes to commercial broadcast stations. It requires-pursuant
to certain formula that I knew like the back of my hand a year ago
but I just have a sketch of it now in my mind-that cable compa-
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id.; S. REP. No. 92, supra note 14, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1135.
18. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 14, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1135; see
138 CONG. REC. S712-01, S714 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
19. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 14, at 54.
20. Id. at 52.
21. In re Inquiry Into the Availability of Broadcast Television Signals on Cable
Television Systems, Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1988).
22. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 14, at 52-53; S. REP. NO. 92, supra note 14, at
42-43, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1175-76.
23. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp.
IV 1992)).
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nies carry local broadcast commercial stations on up to one-third
of their channels.24 Section 5 goes to public broadcast, or noncom-
mercial stations, and usually in most markets by impact, section 5
cable companies are going to be required to carry from one to three
public broadcasting stations on their channel systems.25
Before, or the same day that Congress passed, over George
Bush's veto, the 1992 Cable Act, Turner Broadcasting System
delivered the complaint to the district court-I think it was on
October 5 or around October 4 of 1993-which was then subse-
quently delivered to my desk, and thereafter, four other plaintiffs
came in and intervened. These cases were all consolidated in what
we now know as Turner.26 They were briefed to death. I think the
New York Times, as somebody this morning also remarked, counted
the number of lawyers involved in these cases. I think there were
126 before the Supreme Court. I don't know that there were that
many in the lower court, but nearly that many, and we went at it.
The cable companies wanted to wrap themselves in the editorial
page of newspapers and insisted before the three judges in the
district court that they stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their breth-
ren and sisters in the print media.27 And just as the Supreme Court
has never countenanced any kind of regulation over the print me-
dia,28 so too should it not countenance regulation of cable program-
mers. In other words, the cable operators, cable programmers, the
cable industry wanted to get as far away from the broadcast stan-
dard announced in Red Lion29 as possible and declared that there
were two principal evils that were committed by the "must carry"
provisions. First, that it infringes upon cable operators' editorial
control of what goes over their channel. It is for cable operators,
and certainly not government, to make these decisions.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 535(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
26. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.), cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
27. Time Warner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion
for Summary Judgment at 9, Turner (No. 92-2247).
28. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1979).
29. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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The second evil-the second principal evil-is that Congress,
in effect, pursuant to the "must carry" provisions, favors one group
of speakers, that is broadcasters, over the other, and in support of
this, the cable operators were able to refer to the legislative history
behind the 1992 Act. There, Congress, or the committees involved,
expressed approval or stated their approval and their intent to pre-
serve the speech of commercial broadcasters because Congress
believes that local broadcasting stations serve a great purpose in
our communities, and so, too, Congress expressed its approval of
noncommercial or public broadcasting, speaking most especially to
the educational value that noncommercial broadcast stations pro-
vide.
In essence, the cable operators argued before the Court that
these "must carry" provisions are content-based and are subject to
heightened scrutiny and as somebody remarked earlier this morn-
ing, if a regulation or law is subject to heightened scrutiny, it shall
not survive. I personally am not aware of a single case in which
heightened scrutiny has been applied to a regulation and it has been
affirmed in any court. I might be wrong, but I'm not aware of
such a case.
We, on behalf of the government's interests and on behalf of
your interests, came in before the Court and said, this is all abso-
lute nonsense. What Congress was principally concerned about
were gross anticompetitive practices by cable operators. They are
not like newspapers. Remember, newspapers oftentimes have no
competition in a local market. We have many of what are known
as one-newspaper towns due to natural monopoly. Most communi-
ties can only support one newspaper. This town, of course, has
several. Washington, D.C. has two. But who wins in these mar-
kets wins by their own competitive efforts. How many voices or
how many people will their voice appeal to? The more newspapers
we buy, of course, the more attracted advertisers will be to those
newspapers.
In the cable market, in what I believe to be sharp contrast,
cable companies have a technological advantage. They now con-
trol the principal means by which video programming reaches 60
percent of the American households, and for that reason, by that
19941
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advantage, they can-I'm speaking to the cable operators-cut off
the signal of their broadcast competitors, and for that reason they
have this unnatural monopoly, if you will. Congress found that
they've taken advantage of this power, and for that reason, Con-
gress passed the "must carry" rules to address this anticompetitive
conduct.
I've been told I've already overstepped my allotted time, so I
will then, for that reason, turn it over to Bob Joffe, who will tell
you that what I've said so far is utter nonsense, and he will tell
what really is going on here.
MR. JOFFE: Good morning. We're all lucky as citizens to
have such a skilled advocate as Mr. Tyler purporting to represent
our interests. One of the indicia of his great ability as an advocate
is the fact that the Justice Department, only eighteen months ago,
was advising the President of the United States that the "must car-
ry" provisions of the law were unconstitutional. And that is the
advice the Department of Justice gave to President Bush, and Presi-
dent Bush vetoed the Act based on that advice. In fact, the Justice
Department informed the court in this very case that they would
not defend this Act because of the advice they had given the Presi-
dent.3 ° It was only with the change of administration that the Jus-
tice Department's view of constitutionality changed. Mr. Tyler
would have argued the opposite position equally skillfully, I'm
sure, had the administration not changed.
The "must carry" provisions of the 1992 Cable Act subject
cable operators and cable programmers to substantial government
interference in deciding what news, information and entertainment
will be available to the public.31 Twice the FCC has tried to im-
30. See letter from Stuart Gerson, Ass't Attorney General, to Dan Quayle, President
of the Senate (Nov. 4, 1992) ("[wle will promptly notify [the three-judge] court of the
Justice Department's decision not to defend the constitutionality of sections 4 and 5 of
the Act") (on file with panelist).
31. Section 4 of the Act requires most cable operators-those operating systems with
more than twelve activated channels-to devote up to one-third of their channel capacity
to carriage of local commercial broadcast stations. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV
1992). When there is an insufficient quantity of full power local commercial broadcast
stations to fulfill the required "set asides," cable operators also must carry "low power"
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pose these mandatory carriage rules and twice the D.C. Circuit has
struck down the rules as unconstitutional.32 Such regulation is
unheard of for a member of the media, which suffers from none of
the limitations of spectrum scarcity, the only rationale which has
thus far justified less than full First Amendment protection for a
member of the media.33
The Act is justified as an attempt to create a level playing field
between broadcast interests and cable interests. It's important to
bear in mind, however, that the First Amendment is a limit on
government's power. "Congress shall make no law . .. ,4 It is
not a source of power by which Congress can achieve socio-eco-
nomic or even communications benefits. It's not like the Four-
teenth Amendment. It doesn't have a provision in it saying that
Congress shall have the power to implement this or to enforce it.
The First Amendment is a limit on Congress' power.
Today, cable serves over 54 million homes3 and is an impor-
tant source for a wide array of news, information and entertain-
ment. The importance of the case now pending before the Su-
preme Court is that it will help decide whether cable is to be
treated like a First Amendment speaker or some sort of a stepchild.
In providing this news, information and entertainment, a cable
broadcast stations. 47 U.S.C. § 534(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
In addition to the required one-third allocation of channel capacity for commercial
stations, section 5 requires cable operators to carry local noncommercial educational
stations. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Any cable system with more than
thirty-six channels generally "must carry" any qualifying local noncommercial station.
47 U.S.C. § 535(b)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1992). Cable systems with between thirteen and
thirty-six channels are required to carry up to three noncommercial stations. 47 U.S.C.
§ 535(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
32. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) ("Where
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compa-
rable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
521 (Supp. IV 1992)) (finding that nearly 56 million households subscribe to cable).
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operator engages in a variety of activities, much like those engaged
in by a newspaper or bookstore owner in selecting programming,
determining how to package these services to subscribers, and de-
ciding what tier to put these services on. Cable has also developed
a large number of new programming services. There are now
eighty national and forty-eight regional programming networks, and
many cable operators create their own services. If you subscribe
here in New York, you undoubtedly see New York-i, a 24-hour
local news channel which is offered on local cable systems.
In his concurring opinion below-I guess sort of overwhelmed
by the force of John's argument-Judge Sporkin said that our invo-
cation of the First Amendment was mischievous, and I quote, "It
is inconceivable that our forefathers at any time contemplated that
the First Amendment would be used to regulate an industry that
came into existence over 150 years after the Bill of Rights was
adopted."36
I suggest Judge Sporkin was myopically literal. Unless the
First Amendment is held to apply to cable, we'll enter the next
century with the most important means of communication unpro-
tected by that amendment which our forefathers and our
foremothers thought was the bedrock of all our liberties.
Let me turn for a second to the "must carry" provisions. They
compel cable operators to allocate up to 40 percent of their chan-
nels to local television stations.37 They mandate the particular
channel on which such stations are carried,38 and they require that
broadcast channels be carried and sold by an operator in the basic
tier, which all the subscribers must receive.39 This kind of regula-
tion obviously would be totally unacceptable if we were talking
about a newspaper.
Let's turn to the critical issue-the proper First Amendment
standard to apply here. We, of course, say that it's strict scrutiny
36. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 56 (D.D.C.) (Sporkin,
J., concurring), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1), 535(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
38. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(6), 535(g)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
39. 47 U.S.C. §§ 543(b)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
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which, as John says, is a standard that rarely is surmounted by
subject legislation.4° What kind of regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny? First of all, regulations that are content-based, regula-
tions that compel speech-which is another form of content-based
regulation-regulations which restrict the voice of some people in
order to enhance the voice of others, and provisions that single out
the press or some portion of the press for especially harsh treat-
ment.
The "must carry" rules embody all of these types of fatal flaws.
To determine whether the provisions are content-based requires that
a court look beyond the legislature's mere recitation that they're
not engaging in content-based regulation. Otherwise, Congress
could shield virtually any statutory scheme from review by coming
up with an appropriate set of content-neutral findings.
Applying a common sense understanding to the "must carry"
regulations, we come inescapably to the conclusion that they are
content-based. They necessarily alter a cable operator's program-
ming and replace it with a government decision as to what to carry.
Even the congressional findings themselves make clear a content
related judgment was being made to favor local broadcast speech
rather than cable speech. Congress didn't hide its intent here. For
example, section 2(a)( 11) of the Act emphasizes the preservation
of local news and public affairs programming41 and there are other
provisions like that.42
40. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion); Minneapolis Star & Tri-
bune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
41. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. at 1461 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
521 (Supp. IV 1992)).
42. See, e.g., id. § 2(a)(7), 106 Stat. at 1461 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV
1992)) (finding substantial interest in ensuring access to "local noncommercial educational
stations" and stating that "distribution of unique noncommercial, educational programming
services advances that interest"); id. § 2(a)(8)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV
1992)) ("public television... provides public service programming that is responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community"); id. § 2(a)(8)(C) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 521 (Supp. IV 1992)) (specifying public television's "integral role in serving the educa-
tional and informational needs of local communities"); id. § 2(a)(10) (codified at 47
1994]
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The cases are clear that not just an outright ban of a particular
viewpoint causes strict scrutiny to apply. Other restrictions such
as those that are involved here do as well. Regulations which
compel speech, Riley,43 Pacific Gas & Electric,4 the Tornillo
case,45 are all examples of cases where strict scrutiny was invoked.
The lower court here-again undoubtedly swayed by John's
argument-refused to recognize that compelled speech is another
form of content-based regulation, unless the government not only
compels speech but also compels speech of a particular content.46
That's what's called viewpoint-based regulation. That decision
really is wrong. It's unnecessarily restrictive. A decision to com-
pel speech necessarily involves some kind of line drawing which
determines which speech will be carried and which speech shall not
be carried, and that is content-based regulation. In Riley, the Su-
preme Court said, "[m]andating speech that a speaker would not
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech and is
content-based. '47 You couldn't describe the "must carry" rules any
better than that.
The "must carry" rules obviously intrude into the cable opera-
tor's editorial discretion. In Tornillo, the Supreme Court held that
U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV 1992)) (citing the objective and benefit in "local origination of
programming").
The legislative history likewise reveals similar content-based judgments. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 14, at 56 (discussing the "importance of local program-
ming," including local news); id. at 69 (discussing array of noncommercial programming,
such as "Sesame Street," "3-2-1 Contact," "The McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," and "Nova");
id. at 51-52 (discussing the harm noncarriage poses to local broadcasters in the form of
"forced reductions in local news, public affairs, and other public interest programs"); S.
REP. No. 92, supra note 14, at 59, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1192 (citing poten-
tial audience loss by broadcasters who might be "unable to continue to provide local
public service programming ... [tihat would ... lead to diminished diversity of opin-
ion").
43. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
44. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
45. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
46. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 42 (D.D.C.) ("A com-
pulsory speech requirement, or one imposing upon the discretion of a speaker to say only
what he wishes, it appears, is to be strictly scrutinized only if it appears that the govern-
ment has prescribed the content--either the message or the subject matter-of the speech
to be spoken."), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
47. 487 U.S. at 795.
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a statute which impaired that discretion cannot survive judicial
48review.
We focused on the effect on cable operators until now, but
there's also an impact on cable programmers, like HBO, CNN or
Discovery, who are discriminated against. Congress has made a
choice that it prefers the speech of broadcasters, even if they are
home-shopping stations, to that of cable programmers like Discov-
ery or C-SPAN, even if the cable operator feels that the cable ser-
vices would better enhance his package.
"[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment., 49 That's a
direct quote from the Supreme Court. Despite all of these factors
compelling the application of strict scrutiny, the government and
the broadcast industry would tell you that cable speakers are not
entitled to full or perhaps any First Amendment protection. What
is the argument they put forth to support that proposition? It's
something that they often call the "bottleneck" theory. Now this
theory argues that cable operators will exercise their supposed
monopoly power to deny carriage to local broadcast stations. The
government is therefore justified-the argument goes-to intervene.
The argument is wrong. It's wrong on two levels. There's a
factual predicate that's missing. The government study that John
referred to said that only 20 percent of the cable operators had ever
dropped any station, and of that, 50 percent had only dropped one
station. Ninety-eight percent of the stations would be carried any-
way. There is, of course, a big difference-one of constitutional
dimensions-whether you carry stations because you want to or
you carry stations because you're forced to.
But put aside for the moment the factual predicate for the con-
gressional finding. It doesn't work as a matter of law. There is no
physical scarcity here, and that is the only instance that the Su-
preme Court has said which justifies intruding on the speaker's
48. 418 U.S. at 258 (statute "fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment
because of its intrusion into the function of editors").
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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right to speak.5°
Here, there is no physical limitation. The evidence was uncon-
tested. The number of cable systems available in an area is not a
physical limitation. There's enough room on telephone poles or in
ducts for more than one cable system. The reason generally there
is not more than one cable system in an area is for economic rea-
sons.
Tornillo makes clear that economic scarcity, even something
called "natural monopoly," is not a sufficient basis to curtail the
First Amendment right of speakers.5 1 The argument in favor of the
right of reply statute in Florida was virtually the same as the argu-
ment that's made here in support of the "must carry" statute, but
it was held insufficient there, and it ought to be insufficient here.
There was a so-called natural monopoly phenomenon with re-
spect to newspapers. Most towns in America had one major news-
paper; some only had one newspaper, period. Only 4 percent of
our large cities have more than one newspaper. It was argued in
Tornillo that the First Amendment interest of the public in being
informed was in peril because of this horrible thing called vertical
integration s2 -horrible in the government's words. But the same
thing was happening in the newspaper industry.
The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments and said, "A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press re-
sponsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated., 53
Let's turn now to balancing. Let's assume for a minute that
strict scrutiny applies, although I think I will be able to convince
you that no matter what standard applies, the legislation should fall.
The asserted government interest here is protection of broad-
casters whose very existence-it's said by Congress-is jeopar-
50. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
51. See 418 U.S. at 249 n.13 (any right of access imposed by government "at once
brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment" even
where one-newspaper towns are the rule).
52. id. at 249-50.
53. Id. at 256.
[Vol. 4:701
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON "MUST CARRY"
dized by the power of cable.54 The lower court below just accepted
this.5" If the court had applied any kind of heightened scrutiny, as
it is obliged to do when First Amendment rights are at stake, 56 it
would have been readily apparent that there is no factual basis for
the conclusion that local broadcasting is in need of special protec-
tion in order to preserve it. A legislature can't insulate its uncon-
stitutional policies from judicial review by making up an appropri-
ate set of legislative findings. As then-Judge Thomas said in
Lamprecht v. FCC,57 if a legislature could make a statute constitu-
tional, simply by finding that black is white, or freedom slavery,
judicial review would be an elaborate farce.58
On the undisputed record in this case, broadcast television is
healthy and thriving, as Judge Bork said at the oral argument in the
Quincy case5 9 when he was told that these FCC rules had to be
sustained because the broadcast industry would otherwise fall, he
said, "Where are the cadavers?" There have been no "must carry"
rules in effect for the last ten years, and there are no cadavers.
Broadcast station licenses are not going begging; the broadcast
industry is thriving.6
54. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
521 (Supp. IV 1992)) (stating that "the economic viability of free local broadcast televi-
sion" will be "seriously jeopardized").
55. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 46-47 (D.D.C.) (the
majority, "unwilling to second-guess Congress' determination," concluded that "the danger
perceived by Congress is real and substantial"), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
56. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) ("whatever
deference is due legislative findings would not foreclose our independent judgment of the
facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law"); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit
judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake").
57. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 392.
59. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
60. As noted by Judge Williams, the number of commercial broadcast stations has
increased by 22 percent (from 919 in 1986 to 1,118 in 1992), the number of noncommer-
cial educational broadcast stations increased by 15 percent (from 316 in 1986 to 363 in
1992), and the number of cities receiving broadcast television has increased by 16 percent
(from 514 cities in 1985 to 594 in 1992). Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 63 (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
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This legislation is overbroad. It helps the strong stations as
well as the weak stations. It doesn't say those stations which are
on the verge of bankruptcy, or which are suffering economically,
are the ones Congress is going to protect. It protects the strong
and the weak alike-it protects them against decisions which are
anticompetitive and it protects them against decisions which are
competitive. This legislation is not limited to saying to cable oper-
ators, you can't favor those programming services that are your
own; it isn't limited to saying, you can't favor those programming
services where you're going to get ad revenue; it just says, what-
ever the basis for your editorial decision as to what service to car-
ry, you must favor broadcast services. In that respect the legisla-
tion is clearly too broad. That is one way of putting it. The other
way of putting it is that there is no governmental interest suffi-
ciently strong to justify such sweeping legislation. Whether you
use the heightened scrutiny standard, or whether you use the very
relaxed O'Brien6 1 standard, it's clear to me that the "must carry"
legislation cannot survive.
MR. TYLER: You know, both Bob Joffe and I were present
at the oral argument before the Supreme Court and I think it was
Justice Souter who said, when speaking to what standard should we
apply to this, he was reflecting, well, you're not quite a newspaper
and you're not a common carrier, you're somewhere in between-
where do you lie?-and that really was the conclusion of his re-
marks. Of course, if the Supreme Court were to agree with Mr.
Joffe that these provisions are content-based, heightened scrutiny
would apply, and I would assume that might be the end of it. Or
if they agree with the government's point of view that at the very
least these provisions be viewpoint-neutral, maybe we could get
into the O'Brien analysis. I'd like to ask Bob, however, in the
popular press, at least, they've been saying this case has gotten so
much interest because people are expecting a so-called cable rule
from the Supreme Court, much like the so-called broadcast rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Red Lion.62 I ask Bob, regard-
61. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
62. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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less of whether he wins or loses-his client wins or loses-who
comes out on top in the litigation, does he expect a cable rule, or
for the Supreme Court to use this opportunity to enact a cable rule?
MR. JOFFE: I don't really. The Supreme Court has already
said in a number of cases, Preferred63 being one of them, that cable
operators are speakers and entitled to some First Amendment pro-
tection. The Court hasn't defined exactly how wide that protection
will be. I doubt in this case they will set out the full parameters
of that right. The Supreme Court generally strikes down legislation
on the narrowest possible grounds, and I would think that if it does
strike down the legislation here, it will do so on as narrow grounds
as it can find. However, if it does strike down the legislation, it
obviously will be setting the boundaries out further than they have
been in the past in the cable area, and it will be up to further litiga-
tion and future cases to say how far this case goes. But I don't
expect the Court to legislate in their decision. They will act in a
judicial fashion and that will probably be pretty narrow.
MR. TYLER: We'll next hear from Mr. Buscarino, who as I
said earlier is with NBC. I don't want to put him on the spot, but
I think it was Justice Scalia in the oral arguments, who stated his
doubt as to whether the broadcasting industry is really in peril at
all. They continue to have very profitable years, and there seems
to be no lack of competitors in the broadcasting industry. Mr.
Joffe says, "Where are the bodies?" Maybe you can tell us where
they are.
MR. BUSCARINO: Thank you, John. As introduced, my
name is Gregory Buscarino. I'm a 1992 graduate of Fordham
University School of Law, and I've been employed with the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company for the past six-and-a-half years.
Currently I'm a financial administrator for NBC's television sta-
tions division.
While I am not an attorney for NBC, I speak to you today as
an attorney and as a member of the broadcast profession, a profes-
sion with a vested interest in the constitutionality of the "must
63. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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carry" rules. My discussion this morning is divided into three
major areas. First, an overview of the "must carry" rules. Second,
historical development and the market power of cable. And third,
the First Amendment analysis of the "must carry" rules.
"Must carry" legislation has come in a variety of forms. Its
most recent expression is in sections 4 and 5 of the 1992 Cable
Act.64 "Must carry" allows the broadcasters an option to demand
carriage on cable systems within the television station's market,
otherwise known as "ADI." Under "must carry," stations are as-
sured carriage on local cable systems without monetary compensa-
tion for their signal.65 Cable systems are required, under section 4,
to reserve cable channels to meet "must carry" obligations.66 A
cable operator with more than twelve channels is required to re-
serve one-third of its usable activated channels to carry local televi-
sion stations. 67 Systems with twelve or fewer channels are required
to carry at least three such stations, unless the system has less than
three hundred subscribers, in which case it is exempt from "must
carry" requirements.68
Section 4 of the Act contains provisions for the carriage of low
power television stations,69 while section 5 contains "must carry"
provisions for noncommercial educational stations. 70 Additionally,
each signal carried in Satisfaction of "must carry" requirements
may, at the broadcaster's option, be carried on the channel number
on which the local commercial television station broadcasts over
the air.71
What these "must carry" provisions have done is prevent your
local cable company from exclusively deciding what voices it
wants you, the consumer, to hear. You turn on your television set
and you can flip to channel 2, channel 4 (WNBC), channels 5, 7,
64. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535.
65. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(10), 535(i).
66. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(A).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 534(c).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a).
71. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(6), 535(g)(5).
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9, 11 and 13, and hear a chorus of community voices. It is the
intent of the "must carry" provisions that despite the growing dom-
inance of cable, you will always be able to turn to your local tele-
vision stations.
As Congress has laid out in the 1992 Cable Act, the "must
carry" rules preserve the benefits of free broadcast television, they
promote widespread information from diverse sources, and they
insure continued competition in the video marketplace.72 Without
"must carry," Congress has stated the economic viability of local
broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local pro-
gramming will be seriously jeopardized.73
Not everyone has cable. Forty percent of American households
depend on over-the-air broadcast signals.74 Unless broadcasting is
protected, a large segment of the population will receive no televi-
sion at all. If cable systems are given the choice whether to allow
broadcast stations onto its systems, we all will suffer.
If mandatory access legislation stinks of First Amendment im-
plications, let's look at the historical development of cable and
cable's incredible market power to demonstrate what is masked as
a First Amendment argument really has an economic face.
When cable developed in the late 1940s, it served an important
purpose of expanding television coverage. The FCC at the time
had placed a freeze on the allocation of broadcast signals, and
cable allowed TV to reach areas otherwise missing out.75 Despite
cable's humble beginnings, Congress was well aware of the threat
that cable presented to the broadcast industry. Early "must carry"
bills before Congress expressed concern that unrestricted growth of
cable could have a negative impact on the development of broad-
cast television.76 A balance had to be struck, Congress found,
72. See id. § 2(a)(6)-(11), 106 Stat. at 1460-61 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp.
IV 1992)).
73. Id. § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV 1992)).
74. See id. § 2(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV
1992)).
75. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948).
76. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141 (1972).
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between allowing new technologies to expand television services
and preserving local broadcasting. If cable's growth remained
unchecked, it could destroy the economic support of broadcast
stations with the resulting loss to local communities.
Early regulation of cable came from the FCC. Its jurisdiction
over cable was affirmed early on by the Supreme Court as being
ancillary to the FCC's responsibility to regulate television. That
was in the Southwestern Cable case.7 The FCC determined that
cable's unrestricted importation of distant signals could destroy the
services offered by broadcasters. Consistent with that, exercising
its jurisdiction, the FCC promulgated "must carry" rules in the late
'60s and early '70s.78
Now with "must carry" regulations finally in place to protect
local broadcasting, Congress opted to assist the growth of cable.79
By the mid-1970s, cable was only reaching 12 to 15 percent of
American homes. Its slow growth was basically due to program-
ming restrictions and local franchise burdens. So to assist the com-
petitive development of cable, in 1976, Congress granted cable
systems compulsory copyright license to re-transmit broadcast pro-
gramming without liability.8° In 1978, Congress also authorized the
FCC to resolve pole attachment disputes, as cable needed access to
local utility lines to operate their systems. 8
1
But the most significant legislation passed to assist the growth
of cable, was the Cable Act of 1984.82 This was an act synony-
mous with deregulation. It lifted burdensome franchise restrictions
to allow for cable expansion, under the premise that cable could
develop only if freed of unnecessary restrictions. Under the 1984
77. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
78. 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.710, 21.712(c)-(f), 91.557, 91.559(a)-(d) (1966); 47 C.F.R. §
74.1101-.1105 (1967); 47 C.F.R. § 76.55, .57(a), .59(a), .61(a), .63 (1972).
79. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4658.
80. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61(b)(2) (1976).
81. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33,
35-36 (1978) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988)).
82. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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Act, rates were deregulated for 97 percent of cable systems."
Franchise fees were restricted, and procedures were established for
the franchise renewal process. The result of all this legislation is
that in assisting cable growth, Congress created a monster. Under
a deregulated environment, rates charged by cable systems sky-
rocketed, with the average cable rate increasing 40 percent for 28
percent of cable subscribers since 1986.84 Some systems reported
rate hikes as high as 186 percent. 85 Additionally, cable faced no
competition because the barriers to entry for cable systems were so
high and communities could only fit so many cable systems. So
cable had been granted a virtual monopoly. Of over eleven thou-
sand cable communities, only fifty-three had competing systems in
the same community. 6
At the time the 1984 Act was passed, Congress also expected
direct broadcast satellite to become a major competitor. Unfortu-
nately, DBS, as it's known, never got off the ground in the 1980s.
Additionally, the cable industry was becoming vertically integrat-
ed-the cable operators and programmers having common owner-
ship. With cable operators owned by the cable programmers, pro-
gram supply would never become a concern. Cable operators had
incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers over
anyone else seeking access to their system.
These vertically integrated companies concentrate power in the
hands of a few people, and these few people are controlling view-
ing selections of millions. For example, TCI, one of the nation's
largest multiple system operators ("MSO"), reaches 22.5 percent of
the nation's cable homes and is run by one man, John Malone. 7
The five largest MSO's reach almost 50 percent of all cable house-
holds, and are run by relatively few individuals.
Additional catalysts in cable's growing market power were the
83. Pub. L. 102-384, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp.
IV 1992)).
84. id.
85. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 14, at 7, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1139.
86. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1145.
87. Affirmation of Jack M. Goodman, Special Counsel to the National Association
of Broadcasters at 5, Turner (No. 92-2247) [hereinafter Goodman Affirmation].
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district court decisions in Quincy Cable88 and Century Communica-
tions.89 In both cases in 1985 and 1987, the D.C. Circuit struck
down the FCC's consecutive attempts at "must carry" rules. In
both cases, it was held that the FCC record had not been substanti-
ated demonstrating the government's interest in "must carry," yet
in neither case did the court ever hold that the "must carry" regula-
tions are per se unconstitutional.
Ladies and gentlemen, between 1988 and 1992, we lived in a
world without "must carry." The behavior of cable systems during
these years gave Congress the substantiated record that the district
court was looking for in Quincy and Century.
Following the demise of the "must carry" rules in the '80s, the
FCC conducted a survey in 1988. Of 4,303 cable systems that
voluntarily disclosed data, 869 cable systems admitted denying
coverage to 704 television stations in over eighteen hundred in-
stances.9° 241 cable systems denied coverage to three or more
local stations, and 113 systems had denied coverage to four or
more stations.9 WCOM-TV, Mansfield, Ohio, after having spent
three million dollars to get on the air, went dark after sixteen
months, having been financially squeezed as a result of not obtain-
ing coverage on cable systems in its area.92
Along with dropping television stations, cable systems were
also repositioning stations on their system. In an FCC survey, 974
cable systems admitted shifting channel positions of one or more
stations in over 3,000 instances. 93 For the broadcaster, channel re-
positioning results in significant audience loss to a television sta-
tion, and is done to enhance the competitive position of the cable
system.
KBHK in San Francisco is carried on TCI systems in San
88. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
89. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
90. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 14, at 42, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1175.
91. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1176.
92. Goodman Affirmation, supra note 87, at 14.
93. S. REP. NO. 92, supra note 14, at 44, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1177.
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Carlos, Fremont and Sunnyvale. It's marketed as Bay Area Cable
12, but you could find KBHK on Channels 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
and 24 depending where TCI Systems opted to place the station in
a particular month. 94
Cable's motivation for dropping and/or repositioning broadcast
stations is advertising revenue. When a cable system carries a
local broadcaster, it's assisting the station to increase viewership.95
Increased viewership means increased revenue that would have
otherwise been earned by the cable operator. So why should cable
operators slice up the advertising pie if they can just drop the sta-
tions? The economic motives of cable operators can potentially
destroy broadcasting.
Now let's discuss cable's so-called First Amendment argu-
ments. The "must carry" rules of the 1992 Cable Act do not in-
fringe upon the First Amendment right of cable systems. Signal
carriage requirements are economic regulations intended to promote
competitive balance between cable and broadcast television. The
Supreme Court has held that economic regulations designed to
promote competition and diversity of voices can survive First
Amendment scrutiny.96 The question is whether the government
has adopted a regulation because it disagrees with the message
that's being conveyed. If so, strict scrutiny applies to the legisla-
tion. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,97 a Florida right
of reply statute granted political candidates a right to equal news-
paper space to answer criticisms the newspaper took on their re-
cord. The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional as
mandating access solely on the basis of what the newspaper had
said.
Contrast that to FCC regulations prohibiting newspapers from
operating broadcast stations in their local areas. The regulation
was found justified and constitutional on diversity grounds and not
94. Goodman Affirmation, supra note 87, at 14.
95. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(15), 106 Stat. at 1461 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521
(Supp. IV 1992)).
96. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
97. 418 U.S. 214 (1974).
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content-related. That was in FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting.98
So in ascertaining the appropriate standard of review, it's been
found the government's regulatory purpose is what is controlling.
"Must carry" is not content-related legislation. It prohibits no con-
tent and it regulates no content. Its purpose is to assure more than
one media voice in the local community. Strict scrutiny does not
apply to "must carry." The standard of review is the four-pronged
standard in United States v. O'Brien.99 We'll take the prongs one
at a time.
First, is the regulation within the constitutional power of the
government? Clearly the power of Congress to regulate interstate
communications is well founded in the Commerce Clause."°
Second, whether the regulation furthers an important or substan-
tial government interest? The government has a substantial interest
in preserving the broadcast industry for cable and non-cable homes
alike. The government has a substantial interest in promoting a
diversity of views in local communities. The government has a
substantial interest in promoting fair competition in the video mar-
ketplace. These interests have been the guiding light of broadcast
regulation and cable wants the power to snuff out the flame.
Third, whether the incidental restriction is no greater than es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest? The "must carry" regula-
tions are not overly broad. The requirements impact only one-third
of most cable operators' channel capacity, if they can fill that,
leaving a majority of the channels to the discretion of the cable
operators. The cable operator retains discretion over which stations
to carry if more stations are available than the operator is required
to carry. And in addition, cable operators are not required to carry
substantially duplicative stations.
And fourth, which we've already discussed, whether the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression? As noted, "must
98. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
99. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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carry" is clearly not content-related.
So having passed the four prongs of the O'Brien test, the "must
carry" rules survive the most stringent First Amendment standard
which can be applied to these rules.
Cable is the dominant media it is today solely because Con-
gress saw fit to create a competitive environment to foster its
growth. Cable has accepted the benefits of regulation, but does not
want the burdens. "Must carry" regulations serve a very important
interest. To place the future of broadcast television in the hands of
cable operators under the mask of First Amendment challenge will
have dire consequences for all. Thank you.
MR. TYLER: I thank Mr. Buscarino who very ably set forth
the argument on behalf of the "must carry" provisions and again
underscored what I think is a critical point, that the cable operators
have this technology; they have supplanted the electromagnetic
airwaves, and they have now the technology to black out the voice
of their competitors. The New York Times, in order to compete
with the New York Post, does not have the ability to remove copies
of the Post from news racks or news stores, but in effect, that is
the capability the cable operators now have. I interject this editori-
al content, because I'm about to introduce Mr. Apfelbaum, who is
also with Time Warner, I believe in-house counsel. This will be
the second voice you will hear on behalf of Time Warner; we are
a horizontally concentrated panel.
MR. APFELBAUM: Thank you. Since you already heard
from my lawyer, I'm going to try to be brief, and also since many
of our speakers today started out with disclaimers, I'd like to start
out with one also. I'm not speaking on behalf of the United States
Government.
Unfortunately, Time Warner Cable is required to speak on be-
half of the United States Government by the "must carry" provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act and by other parts of the law. And
that's really what this case is all about. The case is about who
decides what to put on a private instrument of the media, which is
what we are.
In our view, the First Amendment answers that question quite
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clearly that it's the publisher or the owner of that instrumentality
of the media who decides. As Bob Joffe said, the First Amend-
ment is not something that empowers the government, it's some-
thing that limits the government. If instead the principle is that the
government can do anything it wants in order to increase diversity
or to make sure that, in its view, the proper views are getting
through, I think.we're all in very big trouble. The other justifica-
tion we hear for this law is all this talk of market dysfunction and
how powerful the cable industry is, and I find that interesting com-
ing from someone who works for General Electric. But aside from
that, that's also a very dangerous principle-that the government
can decide, as it tried to do in the Tornillo case 1 in Florida, that
the newspaper market is in dysfunction, and come along and pass
a law that says, we're going to require that the newspaper open up
its pages to others. The Supreme Court in Tornillo said no, that's
not what the First Amendment is all about. Rather, the First
Amendment means that it's the press that decides what to print or
carry. And as some of the people said on the earlier panel and
here, this is especially important precisely because, as the govern-
ment says, cable is becoming such an important medium. If the
First Amendment is left only to apply to newspapers, there's not
going to be much of the First Amendment left in the years ahead.
So if cable is truly as important as the government says, it's pre-
cisely for that reason that we need the First Amendment to apply
there more than anywhere else.
Another rationale that's put forward in favor of this law is
supposedly that it promotes diversity. I find that to be absolutely
ludicrous, the notion that requiring cable operators to carry every
broadcast station, as opposed to cable services such as C-SPAN or
Court TV that get knocked off by this law, increases diversity.
This makes absolutely no sense. During the years before cable
really took off, there were only three television choices for most
Americans, and one former Chairman of the FCC called broadcast
television "The Vast Wasteland."' 2 Now the government is saying
101. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
102. Newton N. Minow, The Vast Wastland: Address to the 39th Annual Convention
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that there is no diversity, that cable has somehow destroyed diversi-
ty, and that the way to fix that is to put back on those same three
broadcast networks. I know Bruce Springsteen said that there are
fifty-seven channels with nothing on, 0 3 but I think with fifty-seven
channels there's certainly a lot more than there was in the days of
"The Vast Wasteland," and I think as cable grows and its capacity
grows, there's going to be even more choice than there was before.
So this is really just a special interest law that's meant to protect
broadcasters who, as Bob pointed out, don't really need any protec-
tion. Because, in fact, cable operators are already carrying most
broadcast stations-and generally I think the ones that cable opera-
tors don't carry, the real reason is that nobody wants to see those
stations. How many independent broadcast stations does anybody
really want to see, or how many home-shopping channels?
I think the government in its brief even acknowledged that this
law can't really work because it can't make people watch these
broadcast channels. It can, if the courts allow them, require that
Cable operators put those channels on, but I don't think even the
government would say that it would be constitutional to pass a
"must watch" law. Maybe the National Association of Broad-
casters would say that, but I don't think the government would say
that.
I'd also like to respond to one thing that Greg said about how
cable operators admitted to dropping broadcast stations. He said
it like it was something that a cable operator should be ashamed of.
We confessed, okay, we did it. But, that's just another way of
saying we've exercised our editorial discretion. What cable opera-
tors have to do is decide from among all kinds of available pro-
gramming sources and programming we make ourselves, like New
York-1 here in Manhattan, what we are going to put on. It's the
same thing that NBC does. Every producer in America would love
it if NBC were required to carry every program that that producer
of the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in EQUAL TIME: THE PRI-
VATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 52 (Lawrence Laurent ed., 1964).
103. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Fifty-Seven Channels (and Nothing On), on HUMAN
TOUCH (Columbia Records, 1992).
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wanted to make. I don't think NBC would like that kind of law.
So NBC denies carriage to all kinds of producers every year, every
day. And that's as it should be, it's exercising its editorial discre-
tion, and that's what we want to be able to do.
Also, Greg said it's "only" one-third of the channels. You can
put "only" in front of any number you want, but one-third is an
extraordinary amount of our channel capacity for the government
to take up. Also, other parts of the 1992 Cable Act and 1984
Cable Act take up a lot of other space.' °4 Time Warner is chal-
lenging some of those parts of the law as well, but I don't think
anybody would say if there were a similar "must carry" law for
newspapers such as the New York Times that it's "only" taking up
one-third of their pages. So I think this case is fundamentally
about what the First Amendment means as we go forward into an
era where print means much less, and if it's really going to have
the meaning that it's had up until now, the only correct answer is
that cable operators are fully protected by the First Amendment.
Thanks.
MR. TYLER: It might be a cynical view, but I've heard others
express it, that are we truly talking about First Amendment inter-
ests here or are we talking about money? Are cable operators the
sort of cigar chewing editorialists that we envision, or Hollywood
envisions for us in our editorial rooms? Do they want and are they
frustrated in getting out their populist message, or their anti-popu-
list message, as a result of "must carry"? In other words, if they
have a point of view, if they have a political message, if they have
any message at all of any import, does "must carry" in any way
frustrate Time Warner's ability or anybody else's ability to get that
message known to all people in America? Proponents or the de-
fenders of "must carry" would, of course, say that the "must carry"
does not serve any such purpose and does not frustrate the voice of
these people. In essence, what "must carry" does is establishes a
104. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (franchise authorities can
require franchisee to designate any number of channels for "PEG" (Public, Educational
and Governmental) purposes); 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (designating
channels for commercial leased access).
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level playing field. It allows broadcast signals to be heard; if they
are unpopular, these home-shopping stations are unpopular, you, all
of us have the ability to vote on that. If they're unpopular, we will
not watch them.
MR. APFELBAUM: But in the meantime you're going to tell
us to take Court TV off to put these broadcast stations on and wait
for however many years it takes them to die their death if no one
wants to watch them. I don't think that's the right answer. Also,
I don't think anywhere in the First Amendment it says you have to
chew a cigar to be protected by it. And you talk about money.
Everybody in the media business is out there to make money for
themselves and their shareholders. That's how this country works,
and so there's nothing wrong with a cable operator trying to make
money too. But the way a cable operator tries to make money is
by satisfying its customers, which includes giving those customers
what they want to see, and I think the First Amendment is better
served by letting somebody who's out there trying to make a profit
make the decision of what to put on than by letting legislators in
Washington decide that this broadcaster is more worthy than Court
TV or C-SPAN, which lets those viewers see what is going on in
Congress.
MR. TYLER: On one issue again that was addressed in the
court is, is there any real record out there establishing that the
cable operators have acted in a discriminative or an anticompetitive
manner against broadcast interests or does the Congressional Re-
cord really reveal very little at all? I think we can get into that
later, but I think lastly we want to hear from Mr. Hyman, who was
a litigant in the Turner case below before the three-judge panel, but
who did not speak to speech issues on behalf of his client, but
instead brought arguments under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, and why don't we hear from him, and he can explain
what his concerns are, and what his client's concerns are in this
regard.
MR. HYMAN: Hi, it's a pleasure to be here and to be on a
panel in which there is no hyperbole and we're not talking about
snuffing out the flame of freedom, as Mr. Buscarino said.
I come at this differently because you see, I'm not worried
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about horizontal-I'm vertical. We speak to a higher authority.
The Faith and Values Channel called Vision is my client, and we
came to this case somewhat peripherally because we are not a ca-
ble operator. We are a programmer, and we program on network
cable by having interfaith religious programming. It's a growing
channel but something happened to its future.
What happened was when "must carry" came, suddenly Vision
was being dropped. It was being dropped by cable operators across
the country as they faced the prospect of having to put on religious
programming.
You see, we've heard a lot about local broadcast television, and
you talk about Channel 4 or Channel 2, but there's also another
form of local broadcast television and that's the local religious
broadcaster, and that creates a very serious problem, I think, that
Congress either did not want to address or did so sub-silentio when
it enacted the law because it was heavily lobbied, as I will discuss,
by the local religious broadcaster.
You talk about local stations, you have a local religious broad-
caster maybe on a low power television, going to a very limited
audience. As a result of "must carry," that low power television
station will now have a fantastic audience for which it did not pay
and for which it now will have the opportunity to present its sectar-
ian message.
Let me try to do this in a little concrete form, just so you can
see the problem as we see it and why we raise the issue of the
freedom of religion clauses as another factor. Admittedly, we are
ancillary to the major issue which is the First Amendment speech
clause. We, too, are part of that, but we believe that this issue
should be presented in the form of religion as well, because it deals
with, as Mr. Joffe says, content-based speech and we are the result
of what "must carry" can cause. Vision and one interfaith national
network are being taken off the air and being supplanted by the
local religious broadcaster which may, in many instances, represent
a particular sectarian view. And why is that? Because there is
limited space on a cable system and when a cable operator must
put on a local religious broadcaster, it's not going to want to have
two taking up its channels, that is, two religious programmers, so
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to speak-one goes, one stays. The government, through "must
carry," has mandated which one that is. And you have to take it
in the factual context it's presented.
There are over 350 religious broadcast stations-local religious
broadcast stations. 0 5 They're both low power and they're commer-
cial. They go to small audiences and they are, in the main,
directed at particular evangelical or fundamentalist viewpoints.
They have, as they are entitled to, proselytizing and on-air
fundraising. They deliver and intend to deliver a very sectarian
message. That is their right. They have access to the airwaves
through the FCC. The FCC cannot discriminate, as it should not,
with the award of licenses for religious broadcasting, °6 and these
broadcasters have the right to obtain a license they can afford and
bring the message they want within that context.
But that is a far cry from what has now happened on "must
carry." These 350 religious broadcasters, who were able at best to
get 40 percent of community market as an off-air broadcaster,'0 7
now will be guaranteed 100 percent of the television market in a
community by reason of "must carry." It is a very serious problem
when you realize that the government is taking this content-based
issue, a sectarian message, and saying to a cable operator, carry it.
You "must carry" this particular sectarian message, and it is-I
submit-as direct a form of aid to a religious institution as if you
paid money, in fact far greater. For money could not buy the ac-
cess that "must carry" has given to these stations.
The impact is substantial and it is not something that we in
Vision are exaggerating. According to Trinity Broadcasting Net-
work, which is an off-air network of 250 religious stations, the
result of "must carry" in their own words is that there will be ten
million new households reached, thirty-six million new viewers
they will be able to speak to, and they will have access to 80 per-
105. DIRECTORY OF RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING (National Religious Broadcaster Pub-
lishers, 1992).
106. See Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 924
(1959).
107. Affidavit of Nelson Price at 6-7, Turner (No. 92-2247).
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cent of the American TV audience. Does that mean that we not
bring about government support of a religious institution? Has the
government not created a pulpit with this law for these religious
stations to bring their views to a far greater number of households
than they could get otherwise?
Now, they have the opportunity to proselytize to a greater num-
ber. That's not bad in itself. It's not wrong; they have the right
to proselytize but does the government have the power to require
the cable operator to carry that station so that the proselytizing can
be done? Does the government have the right to give this station
the ability to now raise funds for its particular religious sect from
100 percent of the TV viewing audience, rather than that audience
it reached, or could reach, through its FCC license?
The fact is that the issue, I think, when put in this context, does
raise free exercise and establishment questions. And that's why
Vision became involved, and that is the issue we have raised. The
Supreme Court, I should note, has not yet taken this issue. We
intervened and filed a separate jurisdictional statement. We are
still pending jurisdiction. One will assume that when Turner is
decided, we will be decided without argument, but I think it's im-
portant that we have presented the issue and that it should be con-
sidered in the context of what happens when government becomes
involved in mandating speech and in mandating the carriage of
particular types of stations.
The law in this area is an interesting one. We are dealing with
-and I won't bore you with discourse on it-the Lemon v.
Kurtzman108 three-pronged test that has been used in deciding
whether or not the religious clauses have been violated. Does the
statute have a secular purpose? Is its primary effect to advance a
religious mission? And, is there government entanglement?
Taking those three, if you apply them rigidly, as the district
court did below-Judge Jackson-"must carry" appears to be secu-
lar. It doesn't have a primary effect of advancing religion, said
Judge Jackson, it's only incidental.'0 9 That is, it's something that
108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 48-49 (D.D.C.),
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just comes about because we have it, and of course there's no gov-
ernment entanglement. But if you look behind what we really have
here, I submit that, in fact, you do have much more entanglement,
much more advancement of a religious mission than Congress
would have, would recognize and should have recognized when it
enacted the law.
The real impact of the statute is that it will provide a significant
boon to the religious broadcaster, and that is not an insignificant
number of the local stations that are going to be carried. The num-
ber is not insignificant or incidental. Its primary effect, well one
of its effects certainly, will be to advance religion. It will advance
the religious message of a particular broadcaster in a way that
money can't buy, and this issue is not one that can be lightly dis-
missed.
Finally, the Lemon test has been under attack recently and I
think Justice Scalia, in Lambs Church,110 declared it dead, but he
is only one of nine. The fact remains that I ask you to consider
whether the government has not provided pulpits for a particular
religious viewpoints at the expense of networks such as Vision.
Consider the issue and think about whether government, in its zeal
to try to rectify wrongs, creates other more serious problems that
have to be addressed. Thank you.
MR. TYLER: All right, Steven, thank you very much. As you
said, this matter was not briefed and orally heard before the Su-
preme Court and I guess we just have to await to see if they issue
a decision concerning these or addressing these religion clause
issues at the same time they address the speech issues.
I would like to go back to the speech issues. Marc earlier
made the point that the First Amendment can never countenance a
provision, a regulation, a law that allows the government in effect
to tell a speaker what voice he has to carry or cable operators carry
on these cable channels. But let me put it to you this way, assume
as I think you have to, the fact that cable operators do have this
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
110. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
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technology-this capability to silence the voice of their competi-
tors-and assume further that there is at least a record, or the re-
cord does exist, showing a pattern and practice of this kind of be-
havior by cable operators in the past. Would it still, or is it still
your position, under Miami Herald v. Tornillo, or whatever prece-
dent is out there, that regardless of cable operators' ability to take
this anticompetitive action, and regardless of their alleged past
history in taking this action, is our federal government prevented
from enacting prophylactic measures against such action?
MR. APFELBAUM: Well first of all I'll go on and accept
your assumptions, but I don't think there is anything in the record
that supports what you say.
MR. TYLER: We can come back to that point.
MR. APFELBAUM: If that were the record I would say "yes,"
that Congress is free to go out and pass a special purpose law that
applies to only a single industry, but if that industry is a member
of the press, that law is then subject to strict scrutiny. If it can
pass under strict scrutiny, and I believe some laws have passed
under strict scrutiny, fine. But government is not powerless to
stand by and watch any such abuses, if there were such abuses.
There are also laws of general applicability, such as the antitrust
laws, which can be applied to cable operators just like they can be
applied to anyone else.
MR. TYLER: Can you be specific in that regard? If the gov-
ernment, the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice, for
example, were to find specific incidences in which a cable opera-
tor, in whatever community, in fact, blacked out its broadcast com-
petitors for purposes principally of getting the advertising revenues
of that broadcast competitor, what, by your compass, can the feder-
al government do, what action can it take that will not infringe or
violate First Amendment?
MR. APFELBAUM: I don't know that such action would nec-
essarily violate any antitrust law. It would depend on a lot of cir-
cumstances. That's why the antitrust laws are there to be enforced
by courts rather than having broad, prophylactic rules applicable to
members of the press. A court can assess the facts. I think it's
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easy for us to say a cable operator took somebody off because it
wanted more advertising dollars. I think the truth is, you'll never
find anything as straight-forward as that. Why does the New York
Times take out one columnist and put in another? Probably making
more money has something to do with that decision, and the anti-
trust laws don't say that it's wrong to do things to try to make
more money. It's only in certain narrow circumstances where
something would violate the antitrust laws. But again, Congress
isn't powerless because it can pass specific laws aimed at the press,
but then the First Amendment and the Supreme Court cases say, if
it does so, those laws are subjected to strict scrutiny. If they can
withstand strict scrutiny, fine. If not, then those laws should not
be allowed to stand. And then we do have laws of general applica-
bility which can be enforced as they should be on a case-by-case
basis.
MR. TYLER: I think, Bob Joffe, you also want to speak on
this?
MR. JOFFE: Yes, on the legal point, I agree with Marc, not
just because he's my client, but because he's right. It seems to me
if you have a cable operator who was an essential facility within
the meaning of the antitrust laws, and he was trying to monopolize
advertising in a particular community and excluded a particular
local broadcaster in order to further his monopoly power in adver-
tising-assuming all those things could be shown-the broadcaster
could get an injunction preventing the operator from excluding the
broadcaster under the antitrust laws. You don't need to go to the
"must carry" rules.
The broadcaster, however, would never be able to win that
case, because in most communities, somewhere between 40 and 60
percent of the people watch broadcast television with a rooftop
antenna or rabbit ears. Cable is not an essential facility. Broad-
casters can and do get to their customers without cable operators.
There was a whole to-do in Congress about the validity of the
"A/B" switch, which is probably something most people in New
York are not familiar with, but that's a little switch that you can
use to switch from cable to your rooftop antenna or rabbit ears. So
even in addition to the fact that there are 40 or 60 percent of the
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people in a particular community who don't have cable, the other
40 or 60 percent of the people who do have cable can still watch
this broadcast station by merely flipping the switch to the A or the
B position and getting their signal on the rooftop antenna.
Now Congress found that the A/B switches weren't being used,
but why is it that they weren't being used? The reason they
weren't being used is because the cable operators were carrying the
broadcast stations. As the study shows, fewer than 20 percent of
the cable operators ever dropped broadcast stations, and only 50
percent of those that did drop broadcast stations, dropped more
than one, so there was no need for people to use their A/B
switches; they could see all the broadcast stations on their cable
system.
So I think Congress and the Justice Department and the broad-
caster are not powerless if the cable operator is behaving in an
anticompetitive way. The problem with the "must carry" statute is
that it doesn't prohibit just anticompetitive behavior. It prohibits
all decisions to drop a broadcast station for whatever reason.
Now this whole issue of the entrepreneurial nature of the edito-
rial decision has been raised both by NBC's representative, which
I'm sure is in the business for purely pro bono reasons, and the
government. The First Amendment doesn't protect just highbrow
editorial decisions by the New York Times, it protects decisions by
the editors of Gentleman's Quarterly ("GQ") and Cosmopolitan
("Cosmo") as well, and yet no one would say that we could force
GQ or Cosmo to carry 30 or 40 percent of their pages for fashion
people who can't get their clothes shown elsewhere.
I think the framers intended that these editorial decisions be
made by independent speakers, and whether they have a profit
motive in their decision or not is just totally immaterial to the First
Amendment, unless they're acting in some sort of way that violates
the antitrust laws.
MR. BUSCARINO: One of the things I think has been over-
looked, and I mentioned in my points is, if you turn to any broad-
cast station, you're going to see a diversity of programming.
You're going to see community shows. You're going to see reli-
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gious shows. You're going to see local news. We don't do this
because we're nice guys. We do this because the federal govern-
ment has created the broadcast industry to give you a diversity of
voices. We do it because we are obligated, in consideration for
receiving a broadcast signal, to send you this information. We
have to send you a variety. The point of instituting a prophylactic
measure is so that we can continue to give you that variety. Theo-
retically, although it would not be economically wise for any cable
system, they could program all channels with the Sci-Fi Channel.
They have that power. The federal government has created a situa-
tion where broadcasters will always give you diversity of program-
ming. The intent is to make sure that there is still a diversity of
voices, and not allow one operator to control the switch.
With new technologies, video compression, fiber optics, we are
not too far away from 500-channel capacity systems. The number
of local broadcast stations in the local community may be five, six,
or seven. The burden that's going to put on the cable operator to
insure this diversity of voices in the local area is minimal. "Must
carry" is for the smaller systems in Kansas, or the State of Wash-
ington, where we want local voices, and we don't want a cable
operator to say it's not economically wise to carry you, so we're
going to snuff out the required local voices. That's the purpose of
all of this.
MR. APFELBAUM: I would disagree with what you say moti-
vates broadcasters. I think to some extent broadcasting is more
regulated than other areas of the press, because the Red Lion case' 1 1
said that could be done, and whether that's right or wrong is not
the issue before us today. I don't think even in broadcasting, how-
ever, there is such content-based regulation that dictates precisely
the kind of programming you have to have on at any particular
time, and my strong suspicion would be that when NBC decides to
drop "Cop Rock" and put on "Seinfeld," it has very little to do
with the obligations of the FCC, but has to do with what they think
is going to attract more viewers. And that's the same thing that
cable operators are doing in making their programming decisions.
111. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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MR. BUSCARINO: We carry "Seinfeld" because you all
watch "Seinfeld," but that is not our exclusive programming, and
when it comes up for license renewal, the public is allowed to
challenge the fact that it hasn't been getting the programming that
addresses the concerns in the New York community. You can
challenge our license renewal based on that premise. We have to
give you the diversity and if we don't give you the diversity, we
might not have a license again.
MR. APFELBAUM: Has anyone ever successfully challenged
an NBC-owned station, and is the answer no because of the fact
that NBC is doing such a great job in providing diversity or is it
that there are really no teeth to those regulations? And probably
that's for the best.
MR. BUSCARINO: I don't think the issue is whether anyone
has successfully done it or not. The potential is there to snuff out
the broadcasters' signals if we don't do our job, and to tell you the
truth, I think broadcasting is doing a good job of giving you com-
munity voices.
MR. JOFFE: But the whole reason, the whole justification
whether it's right or wrong for doing that is there's scarcity in the
physical spectrum in the broadcast area. 1 2 It's considered that the
broadcast spectrum belongs to the public and the government is
going to auction it off. There isn't that same physical scarcity in
the cable area. You can run more than one wire.
Now there isn't at the moment, in most towns, more than one
wire, but there's certainly more than one way of getting cable pro-
gramming. You can get it with backyard earth dishes, there are
two major direct to the home satellite services that are going up
this spring, there are C-band dishes, you can rent video cassettes
at the video store, you can use an antenna, there is not just one
way of getting to the home; there is no physical scarcity.
The fact that there's one cable operator in most areas is no
more constitutionally relevant than in most towns there's one news-
paper.
112. Id. at 390.
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MR. TYLER: The FCC, in assisting me in preparing for this
case, explained that a broadcaster, in order to renew his or her
license, is subject to public opinion and would-be competitors can
come forth and explain how they might be better able to serve the
public interests. In anticipation of that, broadcasters do provide
possibly a greater diversity of voices on their station, and do ad-
dress matters of local interest that are of concern to their broadcast
area. Government, in other words, has always had its hand in the
broadcast industry, and it is principally for purposes of ensuring the
greatest diversity of voices. What's of interest in the Turner case
is, because cable operators are wrapping themselves in the editorial
pages of newspapers and they insist that they should be treated in
kind, it raises this specter, if the Supreme Court does agree with
them, that television will slip out from under this direction by the
government, if you will, this modest regulation, and if that hap-
pens, is that for better or is that for worse?
MR. APFELBAUM: Well I think this whole notion that broad-
casting is regulated by the FCC is another of the many troubling
things behind the "must carry" law-that the Supreme Court has
said that there's a relaxed First Amendment standard that applies
to broadcasting, so government is able to encroach more on broad-
casting than it is on any other members of the press. Now you
have the "must carry" law bootstrapping on that and taking those
government-regulated speakers and giving them a favored position
in another medium. So that's just another part of why this law is
offensive to the First Amendment.
MR. JOFFE: We don't suggest that there aren't things the
government can do to promote diversity. For instance, if the gov-
ernment really thought that some broadcast stations were in danger
of failing, direct subsidies to those broadcast stations would un-
doubtedly be constitutional. There are things the government can
do to help the broadcast industry if it really feels the industry is in
peril. What it can't do is favor the voice of one speaker at the
expense of another. That's the constitutional flaw in "must carry."
MR. TYLER: It's interesting. First Amendment litigants al-
ways come argue before the Court that there's something else that
the government can do, it just can't do this. And so when the
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government is told that by the Court, it goes out and does some-
thing else, and then the same plaintiff litigants argue, "No, no, they
still have it wrong."
MR. JOFFE: They don't always get it right, no matter how
hard they try. That's why we're trying to keep the government
small; you see how successful we've been.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Mr. Joffe re-
garding support of the constitutionality of the telco-cable ban 13 but
attacking the non-constitutionality of the "must carry" provisions.
I'm just curious to hear your thoughts on the consistency of those
two positions.
MR. JOFFE: I think they are perfectly consistent. The purpose
of the cross-ownership rules is to prevent the telephone companies
from cross-subsidizing their own program services. As long as
telephone companies are only carrying somebody else's services,
there isn't any danger of cross-subsidization because they have no
reason to carry somebody else's services. Once they begin to favor
their own services, then there is great incentive for cross-subsidiza-
tion. I'm not suggesting that there shouldn't be a way of getting
telephone companies to be able to carry program services. It just
has not been worked out in a way that's satisfactory to protect all
the other people who they would carry.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The services you're referring to are
program services?
MR. JOFFE: Right.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How is that different than in "must
carry" situation, a cable operator prevented from carrying his own
programming services because he has to carry the programming
services of another? What's the difference?
MR. JOFFE: Well the cable operator isn't a common carrier.
The cable operator is a speaker. It's as if you told the New York
Times you have to carry someone. The telephone company isn't
113. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988); see Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Oct.
15, 1993).
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a speaker unless you let them into that business; it's a common
carrier which has regulated rates. It's a utility, and the danger is
that everybody's phone service will be used to subsidize this other
business.
I think there are constitutional ways of allowing the telephone
company into the business. It's obviously an issue that Congress
has to work out with the proper safeguards and regulations. The
only issue in the Fourth Circuit is, was the judge below correct in
saying that the cross-ownership ban violated O'Brien? And I think
a good argument can be made that the judge below was incorrect.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Both of the gentlemen from Time
Warner have suggested the antitrust laws as an adequate substitute
for "must carry," but it strikes me we've got more than an antitrust
problem here. It's not simply a question of anticompetitive con-
duct. It's a question of preserving a free medium of mass commu-
nication so as not to create a class of information have-nots in our
society.
MR. JOFFE: Well the problem is, there is no showing of that
kind of danger. The record before Congress and in the Court
doesn't show that the broadcast industry is in peril. There is no
indication that the "must carry" legislation is necessary to save the
broadcast industry.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well let's assume for purposes of
discussion, as John was assuming before, that that showing has
been made.
MR. APFELBAUM: The place then to make that showing is
in the courts. I didn't say that the antitrust laws would lead to the
same result as "must carry." What I said is, if there really was
anticompetitive conduct that violated the antitrust laws, then the
antitrust laws could deal with it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What I'm saying is that regardless of
whether the withering of the broadcast industry is the result of
anticompetitive conduct or not, is there ...
MR. APFELBAUM: As Bob said, if Congress wants to pass
a press-specific law, then strict scrutiny applies. Congress can also
help broadcasting if there really is a problem by doing other things
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like subsidizing broadcasting.
MR. JOFFE: It could give them subsidies, it could give them
tax abatements, it could do all sorts of other things for the broad-
caster.
MR. APFELBAUM: And it does. It gives them free licenses,
for example, which is an incredibly valuable gift from the govern-
ment. But when we say that government should subsidize broad-
casters if they really think there's a problem, they say, well that
costs too much money. So you have Congress saying, that costs
too much money, so we'll just violate your First Amendment rights
instead. That doesn't seem to be the right answer.
MR. JOFFE: There are sort of two problems. One, there isn't
the factual predicate to show that the broadcast industry is in peril,
but, two, the legislation is far too broad. It doesn't help just those
who are in peril. It helps every broadcast station. WNBC, in New
York, we are forced to carry it. Now we would carry it anyway.
So you say, what's the difference? Is all this a big to-do over
nothing? Well that question was asked at the Supreme Court argu-
ment, and Bartow Farr, who represented the cable industry, re-
sponded by saying: probably everyone in this room would say the
Pledge of Allegiance to the flag voluntarily, but that's quite differ-
ent than having a law which says, you must say the Pledge of Alle-
giance.
MR. TYLER: At which point I wanted to jump up before the
Supreme Court and say ...
MR. JOFFE: But fortunately he didn't.
MR. TYLER: And I wanted to say, yes, but the Pledge of
Allegiance is a political oath, is content-based in the truest sense
of the word, as opposed to these "must carry" rules.
MR. JOFFE: I agree it is not just that it's content-based, it
probably is viewpoint-based. But that doesn't really matter. Being
forced to utter something that's content-based is sufficient to make
the law unconstitutional. Being forced to carry a broadcast station
that we don't want to carry when we think we should carry some-
thing else is a constitutional problem. Even if cable were a mo-
nopoly, and it's not, but even if it were, it is only watched by
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somewhere between 40 and 60 percent in any given franchise area.
It is going to be able to sell more cable subscriptions if it can put
together a more attractive package of services. There is a driving
economic incentive on a cable operator to put together the best
package of services. And if he's in the middle of Ohio and there
are eleven broadcast stations there, some of whom are dying on the
vine and running the fifth re-run of "I Love Lucy," the operator
can decide that he's going to have a more attractive package if he
puts on Comedy Central instead. He has plenty of economic incen-
tive to create diversity without the government coming and telling
him what to do.
MR. BUSCARINO: The truth of the matter in response to that
-cable operators have this discretion to program the system the
way they would like, what is economically intelligent for them to
do. This also includes in giving a variety of programs, an idea
known as multiplexing, where you're going to see pay-per-view
channels on fifteen, twenty options on your cable system. They
decided that they are going to put the same type of program on
fifteen or twenty channels. They have this capability to offer pay-
per-view movies on many channels. They must have spare capa-
city on their systems which they're excluding other cable services
that want to also get on the system, but they're opting to put the
same stuff on many channels.
MR. APFELBAUM: Yes, they're exercising editorial discre-
tion.
MR. JOFFE: Right, and it is also entrepreneurial. But surely
the cable operator in Ohio who decides he would rather put on an
extra pay-per-view channel than put on this fifth local broadcast
channel will only do that if he thinks that's going to be an attrac-
tive package to his viewers. If his viewers want to watch that
broadcast channel and will pay more for his cable service if he
carries it, that's what he's going to do.
MR. TYLER: I think we have a question from the audience.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me critical to this discus-
sion, and something that hasn't been mentioned, is the rights of
listeners, which has always been recognized by the Supreme Court
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to distinguish broadcasters from other members of the press, like
newspapers. And I think the fact that hasn't been recognized on
the panel is critical to this discussion.
MR. APFELBAUM: I think we have recognized it by saying
that the purpose of the First Amendment is to keep government out
of the process of deciding what listeners can hear, and that ulti-
mately that's the best way to serve the needs of the listener.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But it seems to me that because, al-
though Mr. Joffe recognizes the fact that cable operators are not
absolute monopolies, it's certainly a concentrated industry and it
seems to me that the government is in an unenviable position of
either-in order to create variety for the listeners, as NBC suppos-
edly does, in order to create that-either they have a thing like a
"must carry" rule as they do now, or they regulate the cable opera-
tors and make sure that they create the variety that the broadcasters
do now.
MR. JOFFE: But they do that now in the newspapers. You
have one newspaper in Des Moines. No one would suggest that
the government should come in and tell that newspaper what to
carry. Why should they tell the only cable system in Des Moines
what to carry.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As I said before, because broadcasting
is different than newspapers.
MR. APFELBAUM: How so?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You have the right of the listeners to
receive a variety of shows.
MR. APFELBAUM: Newspaper readers don't have that right?
MR. JOFFE: First of all, the First Amendment says that "Con-
gress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech"-it's
directed at the speaker. Now the listener benefits from free speech,
but I think our system is based on the notion that the way you
protect the listeners' interests is by letting the speaker speak unhin-
dered by the government.
MR. TYLER: I think the gentleman is right, that cable opera-
tors are different from newspapers, and again I go back to my
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principal point, and I highlight this, as opposed to newspapers,
cable operators do have the technology to black out the voice...
MR. APFELBAUM: John, why is the technology any different
for the cable operator's ability to block someone out than the abili-
ty of a newspaper in a one-newspaper town to block out any col-
umn, any news source, that it doesn't want people to see?
MR. TYLER: You make my point. In order for the Washing-
ton Post to compete with the Washington Times, it has to appeal to
you, the reader. You, the reader, make that choice.
MR. APFELBAUM: Is that true in a one-newspaper town?
Nobody's going to be able to start another newspaper. That's pre-
cisely why the state of Florida passed the statute in Tornillo.
MR. TYLER: If the Washington Post is able to convince you,
the reader, that its voice is the only voice that should be listened
to or read, then the Washington Times will fail and die on the vine,
and that will result in a natural monopoly.
MR. APFELBAUM: Every argument you're making is the
same as in Tornillo.
MR. TYLER: My point being that Congress has found that
what cable operators are able to do is, even if their opposing voice
is popular, by the flick of a switch, it's gone, and there's nothing
you, the listeners can do about that.
MR. APFELBAUM: You can choose to subscribe to DBS, you
can go to your video store, you can watch over the air broadcast-
ing.
MR. BUSCARINO: In response to the newspaper argument,
because we've heard it several times over and over again, if you
want access to a newspaper, the newspaper can turn you away.
What this democracy is premised upon is that if you can't get ac-
cess to the newspaper, you are entitled to put your view on a little
piece of paper and go to a private shopping center and hand out
your views to everybody, and the private shopping center cannot
tell you, "Don't do that because you're on my private property."
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MR. TYLER: It's the Pruneyard case.1 14
MR. BUSCARINO: It's the Pruneyard case, and you can get
MR. APFELBAUM: And how many people are going to read
that?
MR. BUSCARINO: That's not the issue.
MR. APFELBAUM: Well, it is the issue according to John.
MR. BUSCARINO: You have a message to send out to the
public, you put it on this piece of paper, you can get it out.
MR. APFELBAUM: You can make a video and you can sell
it in the shopping center. People do that today.
MR. TYLER: We're about to act like the Cripps and Bloods
up here and I was wondering if anybody else has any question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You had mentioned earlier that a
cynical view might be that this is all about money, and that brought
up two questions to my mind. First of all, with or without this
"must carry" rule, wouldn't the market kill off broadcasters who
didn't come up with a product that people wanted to watch? And
second of all, does the "must carry" rule really make a difference
to the general public in that instead of now paying forty dollars for
cable to see "Seinfeld," should this "must carry" rule be struck
down, they would then find themselves paying eighty dollars to
watch "Seinfeld" on a cable channel.
MR. TYLER: Well I agree, I think your first point being that
even if a broadcast station is able to get on the cable system by
"must carry," it still must compete. I mean if its voice is unpopu-
lar, it will not attract viewers, of course, and then it won't attract
revenues and advertisers, and it will die on the vine, so "must car-
ry" does not guarantee that broadcasters' voice shall be heard for-
ever and always. Market forces do prevail.
MR. APFELBAUM: But it does guarantee that cable program-
mers will be denied the chance to be heard when the cable operator
114. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that an owner
of a private mall cannot exclude speakers because its a quasi-public forum).
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who is running the system has made the editorial judgment that
viewers would prefer that cable programmer. So that was precisely
my point that this "must carry" law can't even serve the purpose
it's supposed to. If the programming is popular, the cable operator
is going to carry it anyway. If it's not, it's going to die anyway.
The difference is that, in the meantime, cable programming that
people do want to see is going to be denied to those people.
MR. BUSCARINO: I gave you two instances in my remarks
on stations in smaller markets that were dropped. Those were only
two, because I have only a fifteen-minute presentation. The list is
a lot longer than that, and it's not the WNBCs in the New York
market-it's the smaller communities who don't have the media
alternatives that we do in this major market. That's the problem.
It's not for New York.
MR. JOFFE: But it's Steve's client who gets bumped off when
the operator who only wants one religious channel has to put on
this little religious broadcast station in Tennessee. The operator
bumps Steve's service off and puts on this little broadcast station
because Congress has said that's what the operator has to do even
if our viewers would prefer to watch Steve's client.
MR. TYLER: We might end on a note of religion.
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